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MASHA HEDBERG*
This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self-regulation in the Russian
construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the gov-
ernment acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry
groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a
weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control-oriented
executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry’s preference for
continued state regulation. The article’s signal contribution is to theoretically explain
and empirically demonstrate how a government’s prior inability to establish intrastate
control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political
authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing
state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic
behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient
and corrupt.
Introduction
Intriguing changes to the regulatory regime governing the Russian construction sector
were introduced in January 2010. Championed by the presidential administration and
its allies in the State Duma, the new regulatory framework stripped a long-established
agency of the prerogative to regulate the sector through state licensing, and instead
entrusted oversight responsibility to private industry associations. Despite its procliv-
ity for centralizing political authority, the government not only condoned but insti-
gated the delegation of regulatory power to industry. But rather than welcoming
the prospect of self-governance, Russian construction companies, both large and
small, persistently and vocally resisted the regulatory change. This perplexing constel-
lation of actors for and against private governance warrants careful attention. Why did
the normally control-oriented regime choose to devolve regulatory power onto the
private sector? Why did the industry have to be coaxed and cajoled into accepting
self-regulation?1
This article argues that the Russian government’s prior inability to establish effec-
tive intrastate control over an ineffective and corrupt public bureaucracy created incen-
tives for political executives to search for alternative means for policy implementation
outside of existing state agencies. I thus suggest that governments delegate public
functions to private agents in order to compensate for the state’s own regulatory
incapacity. I term this substitutional delegation. By demonstrating why and how bureau-
cratic subversion affects the government’s decision to delegate regulatory responsibil-
ity to private actors, the argument identifies factors that shape state decision making
that go underexplored within existing literature.
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While some of the literature on state capacity has demonstrated how governments
cultivate external linkages in order to facilitate capacity (Doner 1992; Evans 1995; Lucas
1997; Maxfield and Schneider 1997), the relationship between the state’s preexisting
regulatory capacity and the “outsourcing” of regulatory authority has not been
adequately brought into debates on delegation to private actors. Rather, extant theories
view the government’s decision to devolve public functions to private industry groups
as a response to business preferences or pressure (Kay 1988), or as a means to comple-
ment the public sector with superior private sector expertise (Grajzl and Murrell 2007;
Héritier and Eckert 2008; Mattli and Büthe 2005), or as a byproduct of competition
between rival state agencies (Frye 2000). While generating useful insights into delega-
tion across a number of contexts, conventional explanations tend to neglect a salient
feature of many polities: low capacity bureaucracies that severely curtail the govern-
ment’s ability to enact its policy agenda. The challenge, therefore, is to develop a
theory that takes into account this pernicious governance problem, thus better eluci-
dating the impetus behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state
apparatus is both deficient and corrupt.
While privileging the question of state motivations, this article also addresses the
second puzzle: Why did industry resist? Corruption in the public sector also factors
into firms’ calculations of whether or not to support industry self-regulation. For many
Russian construction firms, the state licensing regime was strict only on paper. In
practice, few firms were punished for failing to comply with regulatory mandates. As
a result, firms viewed self-regulation as the stricter and more costly alternative to
continued regulation by corruptible regulators. When the “shadow of hierarchy”—the
threat of direct government intervention—can be attenuated through resort to informal
ties, as well as outright bribes, there are fewer incentives for firms to embrace
self-governance.
The article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews existing explanations for delegation
to industry and highlights the literature’s shortcomings in dealing with states with
weak regulatory capacity. Part II elaborates on what I term substitutional delegation. Part
III provides the case study. The research brings together interviews with firms, busi-
ness associations, and government officials that I conducted in Russia in 2008 and 2010,
as well as an extensive examination of the available primary sources.2 Part IV evaluates
the argument against alternative explanations in light of the empirical record. The
conclusion in Part V discusses avenues for further research.
I. Government Actors, Private Agents, and Delegation
By drawing out the relationship between the government’s decision to cede regulatory
authority and the state’s preexisting regulatory capacity, the argument seeks to
augment the existing literature that either neglects the salience of bureaucratic capacity
or assumes a high-functioning regulatory state. The rest of the section reviews the
three prevailing, and rather disparate, types of explanations for why governments
delegate to private actors, highlighting the lacunae that remain when it comes to states
with weak regulatory capacity.
Research on industry self-regulation has documented myriad cases of private gov-
ernance across diverse economic sectors, particularly in advanced industrial democra-
cies. The bulk of the work, however, has focused on understanding why industry
engages in self-regulation and the conditions under which private governance regimes
are likely to prove more (in)effective. Significantly less has been written on why
governments opt to put regulatory responsibility into the private sector’s hands.
Scholars broaching this related, but analytically distinct, question often posit that
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governments do so in order to benefit from the superior expertise and technical
knowledge possessed by industry when developing policy.3 Empirically, what might
be called “expertise-driven” motivations for delegation have been found to be particu-
larly common in highly technical and complex issue areas, such as environmental
policy (Héritier and Eckert 2008) and accounting (Mattli and Büthe 2005), as well as in
markets that exhibit fast-changing dynamics (Stefanadis 2003).
The government’s logic here is largely one of time and cost constraints. As Mattli
and Büthe (2005) note, in “highly technical, complex issue areas, governments are
likely to find the requisite expertise more costly to acquire and maintain than private
actors—especially if maintaining expertise requires keeping up with the latest devel-
opments in a fast-changing technology” (402). The government’s objective is thus to
complement public policymaking with input from the more expert private sector. State
actors would prefer to legislate rather than delegate (see, e.g., Héritier and Eckert 2008,
115), as well as have more trust in public servants over market actors, but the time and
costs involved in building up “in-house” expertise weigh in favor of delegation.
The public-interest motivations for delegation implied in these accounts may, of
course, find detractors. From the perspective of private interest or capture theory,
self-regulation, like other forms of regulation, ought to arise from industry preferences
and pressure on public officials, rather than the government’s attempt to govern better
and more frugally (Becker 1983; Posner 1974; Stigler 1971). To quote Stigler’s (1971)
famous maxim: “As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit” (3). Along this line of reasoning, self-regulation
should be sought by firms, since it can obviate the costly and time-consuming task of
exerting direct influence on state officials or institutions. As Kay (1988) notes, “with
self-regulation, regulatory capture is there from the outset” (34). Government actors,
for their part, are driven to devolve regulatory authority or extend the use of self-
regulation because there is much to be gained from satisfying well-organized interest
groups, a vital source of electoral and financial support (Ogus 1999; Trebilcock 1983).
Moving beyond both the expertise-driven and interest-group-driven approaches,
Frye (2000) posits another logic. Examining the formation of self-governing organiza-
tions in the Russian financial sector in the turbulent early 1990s, Frye finds that state
agencies that faced intense competition from rival organizations strongly backed exten-
sive delegation to private actors. He theorizes that threats from “rivals within the state”
prompt bureaucrats to seek outside alliances in order to secure their position vis-à-vis
opponents. By delegating authority to market participants, who Frye posits “typically
prefer self-governance,” bureaucrats can build a loyal and grateful clientele, which can
“serve as important allies in struggles against bureaucratic rivals” (168).
Regulatory (In)Capacity: The Missing Variable
While the expertise-driven, interest-group-driven, and competition-driven explana-
tions have much enriched our understanding of delegation, they each in their own way
take regulatory capacity as a given, rather than an object of analysis. They thus might
miss the impetus and logic underpinning the devolution of regulatory authority to
agents outside the existing apparatus.
Expertise-driven explanations are largely derived from studies of delegation in
advanced industrial democracies, predominantly the United States and Western
Europe. As a result, they can take for granted that policymaking is backed by some-
thing akin to a “Weberian” bureaucracy—a highly professionalized cadre of honest
public servants that can be relied upon to carry out the policy goals set by the political
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leadership. Hence the literature’s focus on the input side of the policymaking process
and the concomitant stress on technical knowledge or “expertise.”
However, as a bleak empirical record shows, the bureaucratic apparatus in many
countries strays far from any ideal. Public agencies frequently are understaffed and
underfunded. Meritocratic recruitment may well be absent, as can a professional esprit
de corps. Corruption can be rampant and create strong incentives for public servants to
work for personal gain rather than implement the goals laid out in state policy. Alone
or in combination, such factors can vitiate the bureaucracy’s role as an effective instru-
ment for carrying out state policies.
The problem for political executives in such contexts is not just how to bolster the
expertise of an otherwise well-functioning bureaucracy.4 The challenge is much more
vast: how to generate desired policy outcomes in bureaucratic environments that
hinder policy implementation from within. To overlook this crucial difference between
low- and high-capacity bureaucracies runs the risk of yielding only a partial under-
standing of the logic underpinning the devolution of regulatory authority to agents
outside the existing public apparatus. Put alternatively, while expertise-driven expla-
nations correctly view delegation as serving to supplement some public sector deficit
(i.e., insufficient technical expertise), by omitting consideration of implementation
capacity they provide a highly incomplete account of the public sector deficiencies that
need to be addressed.
But interest-group-driven and competition-driven theories, too, underplay the
salience of state capacity, though in a different way. An essential premise of these
arguments is that firms prefer self-regulation over government regulation. This char-
acterization, however, warrants more scrutiny in contexts where the state apparatus is
weak. There is considerable evidence that it is largely fear of stricter government
action—the “shadow of hierarchy”—that drives most self-regulatory initiatives
(Gunningham and Rees 1997; Halfteck 2008; Héritier 2003; Segerson and Miceli 1998).
That is, firms prefer private governance because it can ward off more stringent state
regulation (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000). This too, however, hinges on the pres-
ence of a regulatory state that is strong in a particular sense: It is backed by conscien-
tious and incorruptible public agents which make credible the threat of strict
enforcement.
An incapacitated bureaucracy, however, significantly enfeebles the credibility of
enforcement, and hence the fear of more stringent legislation. When the “shadow of
hierarchy” can be attenuated through resort to informal ties, as well as outright bribes,
firms may not prefer self-regulation over continued oversight by ineffective or cor-
ruptible regulators. In other words, firm preferences themselves may be contingent on
the degree of bureaucratic subversion, and may need to be empirically established,
rather than a priori assumed.
There thus are strong grounds to expect that the dynamics surrounding delegation
are distinctly different when the state’s regulatory capacity is weak or debilitated, even
as extant approaches remain silent on this issue. As a result, theoretical explanations
may need to be more attuned to how bureaucratic subversion alters and shapes state
decision making with respect to delegation to private actors. The next section develops
this intuition further.
II. Substitutional Delegation: Toward a Theory
I argue that the government’s prior inability to establish effective intrastate control over
an insubordinate and corrupt public bureaucracy creates incentives for political
authorities to search for extrastate substitutes for existing state agencies. Governments
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delegate public functions to private agents in order to compensate for the state’s own
regulatory incapacity and circumvent a recalcitrant bureaucracy. I term this substitu-
tional delegation.
The argument starts with the assumption that political executives, the actors atop
the political hierarchy, are, as a rule, concerned with enacting their economic agenda,
whether because honoring policy promises bolsters electoral prospects, or in the
absence of strong electoral pressures, because economic development is an important
basis upon which rule is legitimated (see, e.g., White 1986).
Agenda fulfillment, however, hinges on bureaucratic performance and compliance
with clearly articulated state goals. An institutionally debilitated state apparatus can
thus itself become an internal obstacle to the political leadership’s policy ambitions. A
vivid illustration of this can be found in U.S. diplomatic cables, made public through
Wikileaks, that report that “while Mr. Putin enjoys supremacy over all other public
figures in Russia, he is undermined by an unmanageable bureaucracy that often
ignores his edicts” (Shane and Lehren 2010).
One possible solution to this governance challenge is public sector reform. Yet as all
too frequently found, this strategy is fraught with difficulties. Capacity-enhancing
administrative reform demands not only an infusion of resources and major invest-
ment in human capital, but the cardinal transformation of the entrenched incentives
structures that breed corruption. It also requires institutionalization, which means
maintaining the reform impulse over long periods of time even in the face of stiff
internal resistance (Schneider and Heredia 2003).
Put simply, reliable bureaucratic performance cannot be bought cheaply or acquired
easily. Yet, the imperative to enhance the governance of particular economic sectors
remains and can become especially acute when times of economic crisis or increased
economic activism on the part of the state render particular industrial sectors more
fiscally or politically important.
When the economic policy goals of the political leadership are poorly furthered, or
even directly undermined, by its existing public agents, circumvention can become a
particularly appealing, and politically expedient, strategy. From the government’s
perspective, delegation of regulatory responsibility to the private sector enables the
substitution of a malfunctioning state bureaucracy in all three stages of the regulatory
process—standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.
As suggested by other accounts, delegation helps bolster policy measures with
private sector expertise. As private firms command greater knowledge about the indus-
try, their superior expertise may be expected to lower the information costs for devel-
oping new policies or modernizing regulatory standards (Stefanadis 2003). More
importantly, however, the reassignment of regulatory authority can address the
“output” aspects of incapacity, inadequate monitoring, and enforcement by public
agents. In this case, mandating self-regulation by industry is plausibly the less costly
alternative to continued reliance on a rapacious bureaucracy. As some economics
literature suggests, the “optimal use of [an] alternative supplier involves calling upon
his services when the actual or predicted performance of the incumbent is particularly
poor” (Demski, Sappington, and Spiller 1987; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Sappington
1991).
Relative to administrative reform, self-regulating organizations within the private
sector can be created with speed. Thus the “outsourcing” of regulatory responsibilities
to private industry groups provides a swift way for political authorities to alter incen-
tives facing both industry players and bureaucrats, and to do so in ways that tend to be
self-enforcing. By contrast, the logic of administrative reform is different: Strategies
employed to alter the incentives facing bureaucrats do not tend to be self-enforcing,
TOP-DOWN SELF-ORGANIZATION 5- - I I 71
leaving unaltered the political principals’ need to spend time and energy directly
monitoring bureaucrats to ensure that reforms stick (Schneider and Heredia 2003).
Substitutional delegation also serves to diminish bureaucratic discretion and reduce
the scope of opportunities for graft within the sector in which industry self-regulation
is enacted. As studies of congressional delegation suggest, political principals are
frequently drawn to constrain bureaucratic autonomy when bureaucrats’ preferences
diverge from those of legislators (Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Lewis 2003). Corrup-
tion within the public sector, in this sense, should be viewed as a particularly severe
case of misalignment of interests between political principals seeking to enact an
economic agenda and self-regarding public agents seeking private gain. Endemic, as
opposed to localized, corruption also renders traditional mechanisms that enable
principals to monitor agents or to establish incentive schemes that better align agents’
interests considerably more costly to undertake than in national settings with less
subversion.
The top-down fostering of private industry groups may also create an additional
mechanism through which to monitor and discipline wayward public servants. As
Markus (2007) shows, the Putin administration began to involve three peak-level
business associations in the policymaking process in order to exert pressure on a
recalcitrant bureaucracy. Similarly, Lucas (1997) argues that mobilized business asso-
ciations can “act as a force for disciplining the state in limited areas” (74). This also is
consistent with studies showing that interest groups serve as “fire alarms” that alert
policymakers to bureaucratic transgressions (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995;
Hopenhayn and Lohmann 1996; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Notably, however,
the argument made here goes beyond these works by suggesting that rather than
simply “authorize” existing groups, the government itself initiates the formation of de
novo groups that can act as substitutes for underperforming bureaucracies.5
To be clear, the ultimate success of a substitutional strategy likely depends on
whether firms respond favorably. Fortunately or unfortunately, political authorities are
neither omniscient nor infallible. Policymakers can decide to devolve authority to
industry, but then make poor choices with respect to institutional design, the proper
mix of positive and negative incentives that promote “responsible self-rule.”6 That is,
failure may ensue irrespective of government intentions. The question of the ex post
conditions for successful outcomes, however, is analytically separate from the question
of ex ante motivations that the present research seeks to address.
The next section provides a case study to probe the initial plausibility of the new
analytical lens being proposed. Notwithstanding the limitations of a single case, the
advent of industry self-regulation in the Russian construction sector provides suffi-
cient evidence both to test the link between the logic of the theory and observed
behavior, and to compare the argument against several alternative explanations that
could be advanced to account for the government’s decision to devolve regulatory
power onto the private sector.
III. The Imperative to Rebuild Russia
Over the past decade, the Putin and Medvedev administrations have sought to enact
an ambitious modernization plan for Russia, with new construction as a key building
block in the Russian Development Strategy for 2020. As one government official aptly
put, “All modern long-term state programs in Russia these days have a decidedly clear
‘building hue.”7 The grandest projects involved preparations for the 2012 APEC
Summit in Vladivostok, the 2013 Universiade in Kazan, and the 2014 Winter Olympics
in Sochi. The federal budget for 2011–2013 allocated $17.5 billion for the Sochi projects
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alone. As numerous observers have noted, “The Sochi Games, in many respects, reflect
a personal ambition of President Putin, the most audacious in a series of megaprojects
that illustrate the nation’s rise from post-Soviet chaos under his leadership”
(Herszenhorn 2014).
Less visible, but no less a priority, has been residential construction, which in 2008
Putin designated a “strategic state objective” (RIA Novosti September 23, 2008). The
national project “Accessible Housing” initially aimed to double the annual rate of
housing construction to 80 million square meters. Unwilling to settle for a mere 80
million, then-president-to-be Medvedev upped the ante at the 2007 Presidential
Council for Priority National Projects, promising 100–130 million square meters a year.
The program “Public Health,” meanwhile, called for the building of modern medical
centers throughout Russia. Further initiatives sought to develop new economic-
industrial zones across the country. The 2008 economic crisis augmented the govern-
ment’s role in the construction market. As summed up by one industry report: “As the
flow of private investment into construction activity became markedly weaker, state-
funded projects began to account for a more substantial proportion of construction
activity” (PMR Publications 2010).
The country’s decaying infrastructure also attracted the government’s notice. In
2005, the Emergency Situations Ministry warned that aging Soviet-era infrastructure
would be a major factor in industrial accidents. The public outcry following the deadly
accidents at Moscow’s Transvaal amusement park in 2004 and the Basmanny market in
2006, when buildings earlier found safe by state inspectors unexpectedly collapsed,
transformed these concerns into politically salient issues. “Russia’s infrastructure
requires urgent attention and in many cases is in need of immediate modernization,”
then-President Medvedev said following another devastating accident, this time at the
Sayano–Shushenskaya dam in 2009 (Smolchenko 2009).
But even as construction grew in both political and economic importance, the
industry remained riddled with problems, many of which were attributed to a debili-
tated and insubordinate bureaucracy. For example, the 2002 Law on Technical Regu-
lation (N 184-ΦϚ) sought the revision and upgrade of some 500,000 GOSTs, relics of the
command economy, to meet the demands of the twenty-first-century post-Soviet
market. Yet, as noted in the 2005 report by the Expert Advisory Council on Construc-
tion, Architecture and the Construction Industry, “At present, not one single draft
technical regulation [for the construction industry] has been submitted for review . . .
even though the federal budget earmarked funds.” Such breakdowns in the chain of
command are common (see, e.g., Monaghan 2012). According to one estimate, “over
1800 of Putin’s presidential decrees and instructions (excluding appointments) had not
been implemented by the time he left office in 2008” (Sakwa 2010, 32). As Medvedev
publically bemoaned: “In order to meet deadlines, our dear colleagues report that such
and such has been done. However, in reality—when a case is examined—it reveals
that nothing was done” (RIA Novosti March 16, 2010).
Official sources, both publically and privately, concede the leadership’s limited
ability to ensure its economic agenda is followed through on by the state apparatus,
often acknowledging that the “deprofessionalization” of the bureaucracy is com-
pounded, if not bred, by rampant corruption.8 In his November 2009 message to
parliament, Medvedev went so far as to call “the state bureaucracy . . . a completely
ineffective system [that] leads only to corruption.”
Indicators show that the state-licensing and state-inspection regimes have been
among the weakest and most corrupt areas within public administration. Data from
the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) reveal that in 2005 over 28% of Russian firms reported having to make
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“unofficial payments” in order to obtain “business licenses and permits,” a sizable
increase from the approximately 20% of firms who divulged doing so in 2002. Notably,
corruption in this sphere has only grown from year to year: The 2009 BEEPS found that
close to 40% of firms in Russia were “expected to give gifts to get a construction
permit.”
In this respect, the construction sector epitomizes the dilemmas of a state with weak
regulatory capacity. In 2007 alone, the Federal Agency of Construction, Housing and
Housing Services (Rosstroi), the industry’s chief regulator, issued over 75,000 licenses,
rejecting only 282 applications. During that time, it forwarded a mere 172 complaints
to arbitrage courts. Unless one is willing to believe that few Russian construction firms
and building projects fail to meet any quality or safety standards, these numbers
strongly suggest pervasive deficiencies in the oversight capacity of industry watch-
dogs, as well as the distinct possibility that the actions of public agents are motivated
by private gain.
Commenting on the state of industry oversight, Viktor Pleskachevsky, a member of
the ruling United Russia Party and Chairman of the State Property Committee,
ascribed the problem to the fact that “control over the construction sector was being
mechanistically carried out by the federal licencing center, which, for money, issued
licences to any company that met the minimum formal requirements” (Zaslavskaya
2010). As Pleskachevsky noted elsewhere, whereas 15 agencies and 13 supervisory
bodies at the federal, regional, and municipal levels technically oversee the industry,
“buildings crumble, construction cranes fall . . . [and] bridges collapse . . . while the
guilty have learned to evade responsibility” (Bryanskii 2007).
Thus viewed, the Russian construction industry exemplifies the governance chal-
lenge that can confront even the most politically powerful governments. Even as the
industry became an investment priority for the presidential administration, with the
state infusing billions into building projects and facing the looming prospect that the
2014 Winter Olympics would shine the international spotlight on Russian construction,
government authorities were unable to alter and improve the performance of the
public agencies in charge. As such, the case presents a prime arena for investigating a
government’s search for regulatory strategies that address the obstacles posed by a
weak and corrupt state bureaucracy.
From Attempts at Reform to Circumvention
Escalating frustration with the public apparatus has over the years led the Russian
executive branch to initiate a series of reforms that, on the one hand, sought to
professionalize the civil service and, on the other, rein in opportunities for corruption.
Such efforts have ranged from the application of positive and negative incentives to
bureaucratic downsizing. Some attempts were made to increase the salaries of civil
servants, as well as refine recruitment procedures. In order to reduce the scope of
bureaucratic influence, several laws from 2001 to 2004, for example, sought to simplify
the process of registering a new business (Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2008). The record
suggests that these efforts proved largely inadequate (see, e.g., Huskey 2012; Milov
et al. 2011).
Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Economic Development and the State Prop-
erty Committee, with strong backing from the presidential administration,9 began
advocating a more novel regulatory approach that called for the elimination of state
licensing in several industries, first and foremost construction. In 2008, Rosstroi was
unceremoniously abolished by presidential decree (May 12, 2008) and folded into the
Ministry of Regional Development. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Putin signed off
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on amendments to Federal Law N 128-ΦϚ “On the Licensing of Individual Types of
Business Activity,” which designated January 2010 as the date when self-regulation
would be introduced in the construction industry.
The new regulatory framework replaced the previous state-licensing approach with
a private certification regime relying on self-regulating organizations (SROs). Instead
of applying for a state license, construction firms apply for membership in an SRO,
which then issues compliance certificates to previously vetted members allowing them
to perform accredited activities. SRO membership was required for firms performing
work deemed to affect “construction safety.”10 Before an SRO could begin certifying its
members, it itself needed to be approved by and registered with the Federal Service for
Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor).
The delegation of authority involved SROs in all three stages of the regulatory
process: They were tasked with drafting guidelines for the industry segment they
represented, vetting applicants in light of admission requirements, as well as moni-
toring member conduct through periodic inspections. If a member firm failed to
comply with either the SRO’s internal standards or existing legal and regulatory
requirements, SROs were empowered to impose penalties, including the suspension
and termination of certification. In order to ensure that SROs had the incentive to
monitor industry, SROs were made financially liable for misconduct by member firms.
Each SRO had to set up a pooled compensation fund to secure secondary liability, so
that compensation for damages caused by a firm could be claimed from the SRO to
which it belonged. To be certified as an SRO in the construction sector, an organization
needed at least 100 members and a compensation fund of no less than 1 million rubles
(c. $35,000) per member. The law enabling self-regulation also provided for the
nonjudicial resolution of corporate disputes through peer courts (treteiskie sudy), as
well as allowed firms to appeal against the actions of an SRO in arbitrage court, though
only in the event of decertification.
IV. Why Delegate? Evaluating Alternative Explanations
Why did the normally control-oriented Putin government decide to abandon the
traditional “command-and-control” approach and turn to a novel strategy of regulat-
ing the sector through private governance? Several alternative explanations can be
advanced to account for the government’s actions.
First, it may be argued that delegation was driven by interest group pressure. Yet,
when asked whether the construction industry would rejoice at the introduction of
self-regulation, then Minister of Economic Development and Trade Elvira Nabiullina
admitted that “thus far, it hasn’t displayed sufficient activism in this respect”
(Sokolova 2008).
Extensive interviews with firms in fact reveal meager interest in self-governance.
“We are wary, to say the least,” said one senior manager of a large Moscow-based
construction company. “Even if self-regulation might have benefits in principle, I have
reservations about how it will work in practice in a country like Russia,” offered the
CEO of a St. Petersburg builder of residential housing.11 As noted by one industry
publication, “[Construction] market participations, curiously enough, support
Rosstroi, even though for them the abolition of licenses, in principle, should simplify
doing business” (Tofanuk 2004). Instead of asking for less government intervention,
firms were demanding either the status quo or an even more powerful government
body to oversee the industry. As the law on self-regulation was being debated in
parliament, a consortium of business associations sent an open letter to President
Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, writing:
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They say that the market will solve all problems. But . . . [t]he present fragmentation of the
industry creates numerous problems in meeting the objectives you’ve set. We believe that . . .
self-regulating organizations will not help the situation. . . . The Russian construction industry
is not ready to master the SRO system, particularly given the current economic crisis. In
general, it must be said that construction in such a huge country cannot successfully function
without an industry headquarters that coordinates all actions, without the necessary super-
vision over activities. . . . You absolutely correctly call construction a key industry. For the
industry to be able to consistently meet the economic and social development needs of the
country, it needs an industry headquarters, namely, a ministry of construction. (Stroitel’naya
Gazeta November 21, (2008)
Self-regulation was perceived as not benefiting the industry for a variety of reasons.
First and foremost, it upped costs in the form of membership dues and payments
into the compensation fund. Firms also feared that industry self-regulation could
spawn informal mechanisms enabling larger players to exclude smaller rivals.12
“Some members are concerned that if standards and rules [are] set by bigger com-
panies, smaller firms will be unable to meet them and will be forced off the market,”
said Aleksei Kozhevnikov, Vice President of OPORA Russia, a business association
representing small and medium-sized firms. But self-regulation sat equally uneasily
with many large firms, according to representatives of the Russian Union of Build-
ers.13 While these could absorb the additional costs, the possibility of exclusion from
regional markets, as well as the uncertainty surrounding how the new system would
work, weighed heavily on even the industry behemoths.
Evidence also suggests that industry was not strongly opposed to state oversight
because regulatory agencies, like the abolished Rosstroi, had already been “captured.”
This intuition gains additional support considering that construction companies
vocally backed Rosstroi as it fought to preserve its functions and prerogatives.
As the president of one large construction conglomerate offered in an interview:
“We always prefer to deal with the devil we know. . . . We know how to comply with
[Rosstroi’s] requirements when needed. We also know how to avoid compliance. . . .
[But] this [self-regulation] ultimately is not about making us [construction companies]
better. Our bureaucrats finally got too greedy for the higher ups, and at the wrong time,
so now it’s time to apply the stick.”14
It thus seems hardly the case that the government delegated regulatory authority in
order to satisfy an interest group. This is not to say that large construction firms may
not derive benefits from the new regulatory regime. But while they may benefit more
relative to smaller firms, it does not follow that the changes were enacted at their
behest.15
The empirical record is also not consistent with the competition-driven theory
articulated by Frye (2000). Like the interest-group approach, it cannot explain the
actual constellation of actors for and against industry self-regulation. If competition
from rival agencies drives bureaucrats to support delegation to industry, then we
would expect Rosstroi, the most embattled state agency, to vocally back self-regulation.
Rosstroi, however, tenaciously fought to preserve state licensing.16 In some respects, its
stance is not surprising: Given the industry’s ambivalence toward self-regulation, the
ally-building strategy described by Frye was not in the cards. Thus while bureaucratic
rivalries may help explain delegation when industry prefers self-governance, this
explanation fares less well when industry does not.
Finally, it might be argued that delegation was driven by the government’s desire
to avoid blame for future negative outcomes (Fiorina 1982), such as industrial acci-
dents. The blame-shifting rationale, however, also seems wanting. First, there were
no unambiguous gains to the state from pursuing such a strategy. That is, even if
political leaders wanted to dodge blame by making the industry responsible for its
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own affairs, this approach in no way ensured that the government would not be
castigated for having delegated responsibility in the first place. If anything, the strat-
egy deprived the political leadership of a means to shift blame in case of need. For
instance, while Rosstroi existed, its head could be made the scapegoat for poor out-
comes, and severely reprimanded, or even fired, to appease public outcries. But if
the move was unlikely to serve much good in front of the domestic public, it was
also too obscure a reform outside of Russia for credit claiming before an interna-
tional audience.
The empirical record is, however, largely consistent with the argument that the
Russian political leadership was attempting to compensate for the state’s own regula-
tory incapacity by fostering an extrastate substitute to public agencies. In both public
statements and private interviews, officials stressed that self-regulation was needed
to alleviate the failings of the public bureaucracy. This emphasis on the imperative
to correct intrastate deficiencies, as well as address the problem of corruption, was
ubiquitous.17
“Until recently, the only source of new standards was the government itself. And it
was always late in updating these standards,” declared Nabiullina, the Minister of
Economic Development and Trade, adding that “such delays not only hampered the
development of new technologies, but were a frequent source of corruption” (State
Duma of the Russian Federation 2008).
According to Nikolai Kutyin, head of the Federal Service for Ecological, Techno-
logical and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), SROs “solve the problem of devel-
oping the regulatory framework (standards, rules, etc.) . . . and relieve specialists
within agencies of the executive branch from performing functions which have a
corruption component, such as monitoring and approval” (Kutyin 2009).
As such statements suggest, while the government sought to benefit from industry
knowledge, the notion of technical expertise can capture only one element of the
government’s rationale for delegation. By itself, it yields only a partial understanding
of the public sector deficiencies, such as corruption, which industry self-regulation was
meant to address.
Self-regulation was seen as shrinking opportunities for corruption, as well as
establishing a potential counterweight to the bureaucracy. “It is absurd to believe in
the benevolent bureaucrat,” said Aleksandre Pochinok, Deputy Chairman of the Fed-
eration Council’s Commission on Housing Policy, Housing and Public Utilities. “We
don’t need monopolies, but we do need self-regulating organizations to consolidate
into powerful structures that are capable of doing battle with the ministries, defend
their views [and] prepare policy” (Pochinok 2010). In a similar vein, United Russia’s
Martin Shakkum, then Chairman of the Duma Committee on Construction and Land
Relations, underscored that “the transition to self-regulation consists not only of con-
struction firms monitoring themselves. . . . [S]elf-regulating organizations can
become the ‘locomotives for systemic transformation’ ” (Sokolova 2009).
Correctly or not, the government considered it more viable to change the incentives
facing the private sector rather than those of the public servants on its own payroll.
Proponents of self-regulation argued that the mechanism of a pooled compensation
fund would engender “elbow responsibility” and induce companies to vigilantly
monitor each other, and punish misconduct. As noted by one official, “a bureaucrat’s
sense of responsibility is circumscribed solely by his salary, since administrative and
criminal sanctions are practically unattainable. By contrast, self-regulation rests on a
community of professionals . . . who assume collective financial responsibility” for
each other (Zaslavskaya 2010). Officials also believed that firms would choose to join
reputable SROs that could confer “reputational benefits.” Moreover, firms were
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expected to come to value membership because of the greater institutionalized access
to policymaking promised to SROs.18
The government’s lack of faith in the capacity of its own public servants helps makes
sense of why industry self-regulation was chosen over more traditional, less experi-
mental, policy instruments—such as reforming licensing requirements or adding staff
to existing agencies to intensify monitoring—for addressing issues of quality and
safety in the construction sector. The abolition, rather than reform, of Rosstroi is also
highly suggestive in this regard.
V. Conclusion
Why might governments devolve regulatory powers to the private sector? The concept
of substitutional delegation suggests that they do so to circumvent a corrupt and inef-
fective state bureaucracy. The article demonstrated that the government’s ambitious
agenda to (literally) build a new Russia created a fundamental mismatch between the
needs of the state and the behavior of its public agents. Rather than continue with the
Sisyphean task of reforming a recalcitrant bureaucracy, the political leadership opted
for an alternative: The state actively sought to create new private agents who could
substitute for malfunctioning state agencies.
In this respect, Russia may well be representative of other developing states that find
themselves institutionally ill-equipped for carrying out the array of tasks confronted by
political leaders. Many governments, from Beijing to Caracas, can successfully
manipulate the political arena, but are unable to secure compliance with their direc-
tives down the length of the entire bureaucratic hierarchy. While there are numerous
political and economic reasons why political authorities may be unable or unwilling to
overhaul the entire administrative apparatus and comprehensively tackle the problem
of corruption, the imperative to enhance the governance of particular economic
sectors, especially when these become politically important, can drive the search for
new regulatory strategies that bypass existing state agencies.
The argument thus speaks to the literature on state capacity that figures promi-
nently in political science. Growing concern over the stark capacity deficits that
hamper effective governance around the world has brought forth an ambitious
research agenda that seeks to understand both the constitutive elements of state
capacity and the causal forces that enable governments to develop and enhance their
powers to perform necessary tasks. Much of this research has been oriented toward
investigating how governments build up the intrastate structures, particularly the
bureaucracies, that enable governance. At the same time, it has also been theoretically
recognized that the capacity to govern can derive from the extent to which states are
embedded in society (Evans 1995; Mann 1993; Midgal 2001; Soifer and vom Hau
2008). The scholarship on developmental associations, in particular, emphasizes that
closer ties to industry can enhance the state’s ability to implement policies (Doner
and Schneider 2000; Maxfield and Schneider 1997). Adding to this latter line of
inquiry, this study showed why state authorities delegated regulatory power to
industry instead of making further investments in reforming the state apparatus. But
rather than focus on state efforts to work with existing associations, as previous
studies have done, the article demonstrated that the government itself spurs the
formation of de novo groups to act as operational substitutes for underperforming
public agencies.
While focusing on government imperatives, the article also suggested reasons why
Russian constructions firms resisted the shift to private governance. Corruption in the
public sector appeared to factor into firms’ calculations of whether or not to support
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industry self-regulation. When the “shadow of hierarchy”—the Damocles’ sword of
direct government intervention—can be attenuated through resort to informal ties, as
well as outright bribes, there are fewer incentives for firms to embrace private gover-
nance over continued regulation by corruptible regulators. In this respect, the argu-
ment may contribute to extant debates about the conditions that support or hinder
private governance. The argument implies that the clarity and content of preferences
for or against industry self-regulation, on the part of both political authorities and
private actors, are likely contingent on the degree of subversion of existing public
institutions.
This study underscores the need for further empirical and theoretical work on
delegation and private governance in countries where the state’s regulatory capacity is
weak. One limitation of the present study has been its focus on the construction sector
in Russia. Future cross-national or cross-sectoral studies can shed further light on the
hypothesized importance of the government’s pro-active role in fostering industry
self-regulation, as well as the degree to which preexisting relationships between firms
and regulators condition private sector preferences for private governance relative to
hierarchical steering by government. Another fruitful avenue may be the study of the
relative effectiveness of industry self-regulation in such settings. While this article has
argued that self-regulation regimes warrant more attention as potential regulatory
mechanisms that governments may seek when public institutions have been sub-
verted, the present analysis is ultimately agnostic as to the prospects of success when
self-regulation is imposed from on high, rather than preemptively or voluntarily
undertaken by industry. More research is warranted before the matter can be settled
empirically.
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Notes
1. Industry self-regulation is defined here as “a regulatory process whereby an industry-
level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, organization sets and enforces rules
and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry” (Gupta and Lad 1983, 417).
2. Fieldwork for this article included 37 semistructured interviews with the owners and/or
senior management of 17 construction-sector firms operating in Moscow and St. Peters-
burg, staff members of 6 business associations who could speak with authority about the
industry, and 14 government officials from the Russian executive and legislative branches
with direct knowledge of, or participation in, the development of the SRO framework. All
interviews were conducted in Russian by the author. Most interviews were conducted in
confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.
3. Policy complexity as a reason for delegation also features prominently within the literature
on delegation between the legislative and executive branches and/or independent (or
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quasi-independent) public agencies (see Bawn 1995; Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001;
Carpenter 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2006; McCubbins and
Page 1991).
4. Huber and McCarty (2004) similarly distinguish the problem of information from the
problem of capacity. They focus, however, on delegation within the public bureaucracy. By
contrast, this study considers delegation to private agents.
5. To the extent that this argument depicts bureaucratic corruption as a hindrance to political
leaders, it runs counter to views of corruption as a tool enhancing the state principal’s
administrative control (see, e.g., Darden 2008; Waterbury 1973). In this view, in addition to
serving as an (unofficial) second salary that helps incentivize underpaid public servants,
graft also enables leaders to exert pressure on subordinates. By first tolerating (or even
encouraging) bribe taking by public officials, but later threatening them with exposure
and punishment, political principals can “secure the loyalty and obedience of officials
within the state’s administrative hierarchies” (Darden 2008, 37). While acknowledging the
efficacy of blackmail for enforcing political loyalty, I question the analytical utility of
conflating political quiescence with administrative compliance. Empirically, the two frequently
do not go together. As Huskey (2012) notes with respect to Russia: “Although those in
state service serve as loyal agents of political principals on matters of high importance to
their superiors, such as re-election campaigns, they often pursue their own agendas as
independent actors on many everyday matters of administration. The result is a plethora
of informal practices that often undermine official policies of the state” (176). Moreover,
since blackmail “requires a robust surveillance apparatus to be effective” (Darden 2008,
43), this tool likely loses its effectiveness as one moves down the bureaucratic hierarchy
from top bureaucrats (e.g., ministers) to street-level inspectors. While the behavior of the
former may be monitored, the conduct of the much more numerous latter is likely to evade
notice, and thus control.
6. On the importance of institutional design, see Gunningham and Rees (1997).
7. Author’s interview with an official with ties to the presidential administration, Moscow,
October 2008.
8. Russian governance under Putin has at times been described as “a dictatorship of incom-
petence” (Inozemtsev 2011) and “authoritarianism without authority” (Stoner-Weiss
2006).
9. Author’s interview with an advisor to the president’s Anti-Corruption Council, Moscow,
December 2008.
10. Ministry of Regional Development Order 274 (issued December 9, 2008) detailed the
activities to be certified by SROs. Construction companies operating without being admit-
ted to an SRO were subject to administrative and criminal liability.
11. Author’s interviews, Moscow, November 2008, and St. Petersburg, December 2008.
12. Author’s interview, Moscow, October 2008.
13. Author’s interviews, Moscow, November 2008 and June 2010.
14. Author’s interview, Moscow, November 2008.
15. See Hanson and Teague (2005) for a discussion of the subordinate place of business in the
Russian political system.
16. Author’s interview with a deputy of the Federal Licensing Center, Moscow, September
2008. See also Marina Gritsiuk, “Daesh litsenziu,” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, October 24, 2007, 3.
17. Author’s interviews with officials at Rostekhnadzor and the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment and Trade, Moscow, June 2010.
18. Author’s interviews with a representative from the State Duma’s Committee on Construc-
tion and Land Relations, Moscow, June 2010.
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